Incentive issues in finance:
Optimal contracts and equilibrium
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When markets are perfect and complete, financial structure is irrelevant (Modigliani Miller, 1958). When markets are imperfect, however, financial contracts affect welfare and value. Focusing on a major imperfection, moral hazard, we will analyse the optimal design of financial contracts and their equilibrium consequences.

First, we will consider optimal contracting and incentives in partial equilibrium. Starting with the one period case, we will introduce the basic notions of incentive compatibility and pledgeable income (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997). Then we will turn to the two-period case, within which most of the economic intuitions of the dynamic model can be obtained (in line with Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Building on this, we will study the infinite horizon discrete time model (DeMarzo and Fishman 2007a and b, Clementi and Hopenhayn 2006, Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet, 2007) and its continuous time limit (Sannikov 2008, DeMarzo and Sannikov 2006, Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve 2010, He 2009, Zhu 2013, DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang, 2012).

Second, we will extend the analysis to an equilibrium framework, and study the interaction between incentives and general equilibrium effects. We will study the equilibrium dynamics of financial managers’ rents (Axelson and Bond 2015, Biais and Landier 2019), the consequences of incentive constraints on equilibrium risk-sharing (Bolton and Oehmke 2015, Biais, Heider, Hoerova 2016 and 2019) and on asset pricing (Biais, Hombert, Weill 2019).

Outline

1) Optimal contracts in partial equilibrium
   1.1) One period
   1.2) Two periods
   1.3) Infinite horizon discrete time
   1.4) Infinite horizon continuous time
2) Optimal contracts in general equilibrium
   2.1) Equilibrium dynamics of agency rents
   2.2) Moral hazard and equilibrium risk sharing
   2.3) Incentive constrained equilibrium set pricing
References


Biais, B., F. Heider, and M. Hoerova, 2019, "Variation margins, fire sales and information constrained optimality," Working paper, HEC.


