

Monetary Policy and Reaching for Income

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Motivation

- Two ways to earn returns from assets
 - ▶ Current income: dividends, interest, rent
 - ▶ Capital gain: price appreciation
- Miller and Modigliani (1961):
 - ▶ The split between current income vs. capital gain is irrelevant
- Financial advisors:
 - ▶ *"Live off income, do not dip into your capital"*
 - ▶ *"The only dependable way to retire and stay retired is to **boost your payouts so that you never have to touch your capital.**"*
— Forbes: How To Make \$500,000 Last Forever (Owens 2016)

Motivation

- *“One way you can avoid the temptation to dip into your seed corn is to use what I call a central collection and disbursement account. Doing so results in the dividends, interest, profits, rents, licensing income, or other gains you see being deposited into a **bank account dedicated to disbursements**, not the **brokerage accounts** or retirement trusts that hold your investments...*
- *It erects a barrier between you and your principal... Never forget this rule: Don't sacrifice **what you want (in the long term)** for **what you want right now**. ”*
—Don't Eat Your Seed Corn: Never Spend Your Principal If You Want To Be Rich (Kennon 2016)

This paper

- Do investors follow the rule of “living off income”?
- What are the implications for portfolio choices, asset prices, and monetary policy?

“Reaching-for-income” hypothesis

- As the Fed lowers interest rates, income from deposits and bonds falls
- Investors who live off their portfolio income may not be able to sustain their consumption
- Investors may move into higher income assets such as high-dividend stocks
- The resulting demand pressure may drive up the prices of these assets
- Monetary policy affects investors' portfolio choices and asset prices

Literature

- **Theories of dividends**

Miller and Modigliani 1961; Black 1976; Shefrin and Statman 1984; Baker and Wurgler 2004a,b; Harris, Hartzmark, and Solomon 2015; Jiang and Sun 2015; Hartzmark and Solomon 2013, 2017 (free-dividend fallacy vs. living off income)

- **Life-cycle theory of consumption and savings**

Statman 2017; Graham and Kumar 2006; Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler 2007; Kaustia and Rantapuska 2012; McCarthy 2011; Carlson, Kim, Lusardi, and Camerer 2015

- **Behavioral asset pricing: time-inconsistent preference**

Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Luttmer and Mariotti 2003

- **“Reaching for yield” hypothesis**

Rajan 2006; Hanson and Stein 2015; Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca 2013; Becker and Ivashina 2015; Gertler and Karadi 2015; Hau and Lai 2016; Choi and Kronlund 2017; Di Maggio and Kacperczyk 2017 (reaching for yield vs. reaching for income)


Outline

- Empirical Evidence
 - ▶ Individual stock holding
 - ▶ Mutual fund flows
 - ▶ Asset prices
- Theoretical Model
 - ▶ Why do investors live off income?
 - ▶ How does low-interest rate monetary policy increase the demand for income?
- Conclusion

Do investors live off income?


- Data sample: monthly stock holdings of 78,000 U.S. households between 1991 and 1996 (Barber and Odean 2000)

Dividend Withdrawers vs. Non-withdrawers



- A group of investors withdraw one-for-one their dividend income (Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler 2007).

Living off Dividends, Not Capital Gains



- No investors regularly withdraw their capital gains.

Who are the Withdrawers?

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Male	(4) Female
Retiree	0.258*** [0.040]	0.258*** [0.040]	0.251*** [0.048]	0.271*** [0.075]
Labor Income	-0.018** [0.008]	-0.018** [0.008]	-0.024** [0.011]	0.025 [0.018]
Home Owner	0.061 [0.055]	0.061 [0.055]	0.089 [0.069]	0.018 [0.107]
Married	0.013 [0.041]	0.013 [0.041]	0.045 [0.045]	0.030 [0.113]
Bank Card	0.005 [0.043]	0.005 [0.043]	-0.019 [0.082]	0.017 [0.052]
Vehicles	0.026 [0.020]	0.026 [0.020]	0.042** [0.021]	-0.075 [0.070]
Occupation F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,394	19,394	11,442	7,952
Pseudo R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002

“Reaching-for-income” Hypothesis

- How does monetary policy affect investors who live off income?
- Low-interest rate monetary policy → reduces income from bonds and deposits → increases demand for high-dividend stocks
- Data sample: individual stock holdings
- Does a decrease in the Fed Funds rates increase holding of high-dividend stocks?

$$\Delta Holding_{i,j,t} = \beta_1 \Delta FFR_t + \beta_2 HighDividend_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 \Delta FFR_t \times HighDividend_{i,j,t} + \gamma' Controls + \epsilon_{i,j,t}$$

Monetary Policy and Demand for Dividends

	(1) All	(2) Retirees	(3) Non-retirees
Δ FFR	-0.303*** [0.105]	-0.151 [0.109]	-0.356*** [0.109]
High Dividend	9.491*** [1.143]	9.069*** [1.262]	9.792*** [1.203]
Δ FFR*High Dividend	-0.946*** [0.338]	-1.568*** [0.377]	-0.669** [0.339]
High Repurchase	0.292 [0.490]	0.742 [0.733]	0.158 [0.541]
Δ FFR*High Repurchase	0.433*** [0.126]	0.334* [0.196]	0.463*** [0.139]
Stock Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,759,502	418,255	1,341,247
Adj. R-squared	0.015	0.021	0.014

Local Deposit Rates and Demand for Dividends

- Data sample: individual stock holdings + Call Report + Summary of Deposits
- **Cross-region** variations in **local deposit rates**
- The channel of monetary policy is through interest income
- One monetary policy for the whole country, different transmission to local deposit rates (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl 2017)
- Deposit rates in regions with more competitive banking sector are more sensitive to monetary policy

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Holding_{i,j,t} = & \beta_1 \Delta DepositRates_{i,j,t} + \beta_2 HighDividend_{i,j,t} \\ & + \beta_3 \Delta DepositRates_{i,j,t} \times HighDividend_{i,j,t} \\ & + TimeF.E. + RegionF.E. + \gamma' Controls_{i,j,t} + \epsilon_{i,j,t}\end{aligned}$$

Local Deposit Rates and Demand for Dividends


	(1) All	(2) Withdrawers	(3) Non-Withdr.
Δ Deposit Rates	-0.883*** [0.209]	-0.858*** [0.228]	-1.153*** [0.393]
High Dividend	7.638*** [1.090]	7.533*** [1.127]	9.233*** [2.305]
Δ FFR*High Dividend	-0.426 [0.364]	-0.401 [0.365]	-0.768 [0.867]
Δ Deposit Rates*High Dividend	-2.159** [0.934]	-2.509** [0.950]	0.694 [1.928]
High Repurchase	0.304 [0.530]	0.0225 [0.517]	1.387 [1.360]
Δ Deposit Rates*High Repurchase	1.119*** [0.291]	0.961*** [0.294]	1.694** [0.768]
Stock Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,296,462	1,064,446	232,013
Adj. R-squared	0.020	0.026	0.012

Impulse Response of Mutual Fund Flows to Monetary Policy

- Data sample: U.S. domestic mutual fund monthly flows from 1991 to 2016.
- High-income funds: funds in the top decile of income yield distribution
- Does a decrease in the Fed Funds rates lead to more inflows to high-income funds?

$$Flows_{i,t} = \beta_1 \Delta FFR_{t,t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta FFR_{t-1,t-2} + \dots + \beta_{10} \Delta FFR_{t-9,t-10} + \gamma' X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

Impulse Response of Equity Fund Flows to a 1% Reduction in FFR



- Inflows to high-income equity funds.


Subsamples and Robustness

- Similar patterns for bond funds and balanced funds
- Mainly driven by retail investors, rather than institutional investors
- Robust to controlling fund risks, taxes on dividends/capital gain, and term spreads

Use Fund Names to Classify High-Income Funds


- Some funds seek to generate high income to cater to the income-seeking investors.
- For instance, the prospectus of **Federated Strategic Value Dividend Fund**: this fund “seeks a higher dividend yield than that of the broad equity market”.
- Classify a fund as high income if the name contains “dividends”, “income”, or “yield”.
- Under this classification, we find that a reduction in the Fed Funds rates is associated with significantly larger flows into funds whose name allude to a high-income focus.

Excess Returns of Dividend Decile Portfolios



- high-dividend stocks outperform when rates are declining, underperform when rates are rising.

Cumulative Return of the Dividend Strategy



- Dividend strategy return comparable to high-minus-low and small-minus-big

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A Microfoundation of Living off Income

- Hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997)

$$\max_{\{C_\tau, \theta_\tau\}_{\tau=t}^\infty} u(C_t) + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{\tau=t}^\infty \beta \delta^{\tau+1-t} u(C_{\tau+1}) \quad (2)$$


subject to the dynamic budget constraint

$$W_{t+1} = (W_t - C_t) \tilde{R}_{p,t+1}(\theta), \quad \theta^\top \mathbf{1} = 1 \quad (3)$$

- $\beta < 1$: present bias, the tendency to over-value immediate rewards at the expense of long-term intentions
- The present bias leads to a over-consumption problem

Model Setting

$$\max_{\{C_\tau, \theta_\tau\}_{\tau=t}^{\infty}} u(C_t) + \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta \delta^{\tau+1-t} u(C_{\tau+1}) \quad (4)$$



- The agent plans to save more in the future, but when future arrives, the agent becomes impatient and consumes more than the original plan
- The agent can improve its utility at time 0 by committing not to dip into capital

Self-control Constraint

- In presence of the over-consumption problem, commitment may become valuable
- Put the principal in an illiquid brokerage account, direct dividends and interests to a liquid bank account: live off income, never dip into principal

$$0 \leq C_t \leq I_t(\theta_{t-1}).$$

- Not obvious whether such rule is optimal
 - ▶ benefit: curb ex post over-consumption
 - ▶ cost: limit flexibility, cannot consume enough when they really want to
- When will the agent commit?
 - ▶ time-inconsistency is severe (low β), commitment is utility-improving
 - ▶ portfolio returns are volatile (high σ), commitment is utility-decreasing


General Equilibrium

- Three assets: two stocks (High div., Low div.) and one short-term bond
- Monetary policy determines the *nominal* risk-free rates $r_t^{\$,f} = r_t^f + \pi_t$
- There is no nominal rigidity such as sticky prices
- Two agents, A and B . A suffers from present bias: $\beta < 1$
- Agent A can commit to the income constraint on consumption

$$\frac{C_{A,t}}{W_{A,t-1} - C_{A,t-1}} \leq \theta_{A,t-1}^f r_t^{\$,f} + \theta_{A,t-1}^L dp_t^L + \theta_{A,t-1}^H dp_t^H,$$


- ▶ $\theta_{h,t}^j$, $j \in \{H, L, f\}$ is the portfolio holding in asset j
 - ▶ $dp_t^j = \frac{D_t^j}{P_{t-1}^j}$ is the dividend yield of asset $j = H, L$
 - ▶ $r_t^{\$}$ is the nominal risk-free rate at time t .
- Agent B is not subject to income constraint

Portfolio Holdings and Risk-free Rates



- No self-control: constant weights for both high and low dividend stocks, $\theta_{H,unc}$ and $\theta_{L,unc}$
- Self-control: the weight of high dividend stocks, $\theta_{H,con}$, increases; the weight of low dividend stocks, $\theta_{L,con}$, non-monotone

Dividend Premium




- Risk premium of the high dividend stock is low when nominal interest rates are low

Implications of Reaching for Income


- By changing the demand for income generating assets, monetary policy may lead to capital reallocation across firms with different dividend payout policy
- Some firms may cater to income-seeking investors by initiating dividends when interest rates are low

Implications of Reaching for Income: Firms Catering



- Firms are more likely to initiate cash dividends when FFR are low.

Implications of Reaching for Income: Firms Catering



- However, the likelihood of initiating share repurchases are uncorrelated with FFR.


Implications of Reaching for Income

- Low interest rate monetary policy may lead to excessive risk-taking
 - ▶ Low interest rate monetary policy
 - ▶ Bonds become less attractive in terms of income yields
 - ▶ More money flows into risky equity
- Reaching for income (current income) \neq Reaching for yield (total return)

Conclusion


- Empirical evidence
 - ▶ “Reaching-for-income” hypothesis: low-interest rate monetary policy increases investors’ demand for current income
 - ▶ The tendency to reach for income is related to the consumption and savings decisions
- Theoretical model
 - ▶ “Live off income, never dip into principal” — a self-control device for a time-inconsistent agent
 - ▶ Monetary policy changes interest income — time-varying demand for dividends

Impulse Response of Bond Fund Flows to a 1% Reduction in FFR





- More outflows from low-income bond funds.

Impulse Response of Balanced Fund Flows to a 1% Reduction in FFR



- Outflows from low-income balanced funds but inflows to high-income balanced funds.

Impulse Response of Alpha to a 1% Reduction in FFR



- Most of alpha occur in the first year

Income Yields of Equity and Bonds

